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The Press Versus the GovernlDent:
The "Right to Know" and First
AlDendment Jurisprudence
by Sean Scally

The first forty-five words ofthe
Bill of Rights provide a powerful
protective tool for the American
press. These mere words are used as
both a sword and a shield. Known
as the Free Press Clause, 1 the words
make the press, specifically, and
publishing, in general, the "only
organized private business that is
given explicit constitutional protection."2 Thus, the American press,
empowered by this protection,
should act on behalf ofthe people in
pursuit of knowledge about what
the government is doing. The argument follows, then, that citizens of
the U.S. have a constitutional "right
to know" the truth about their
govemment'sactivitiesthroughtheir
surrogate watchdog: the press.
Recently, the press ran afoul of
the federal government in its attempt to provide full coverage ofthe
Persian Gulf War. The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press,
made up of such journalistic luminaries as Bernard Shaw, Bob
Woodward, Tom Brokaw, Peter
Jennings, and Dan Rather, issued a
96-page paper citing at least "235
[governmental] actions which have
limited the news media's ability to
gather and disseminate news."3 The
news media's legal challenge was
that reporters should be permitted
nearly unlimited access to information on events occurring in the Gulf.
Predictably, the committee made
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little headway.
Two lawsuits dealing with this
challenge were filed in federal court,
only to be shot down like errant scud
missiles. On January 10, 1991, The
Nation Magazine v. United States
Department of Defense4 was filed
on behalf of The Nation Magazine,
Mother Jones Magazine, The Village Voice, The L.A. Weekly, Pacific News Service, The Texas Observer, and other news organizations, as well as a number of individual journalists.
On February 6, 1991, the AgenceFrance-Presse (AFP), a wire service
of reporters and photographers serving 24 million readers in the United
States, also confronted the "right to
know" issue by requesting a temporary restraining order in AgenceFrance-Presse v. United States Department of Defense. S Due to the
similarity ofthe issues involved, the
U.S. Department ofDefense (DOD)
successfully moved to join the cases.
Specifically at issue in both of
the cases was the DOD's "pooling"
regulations, which limit the media's
battlefield access to a specified number ofpress representatives and subjectthem to certain restrictions. The
plaintiffs in both cases did not challenge DOD limitations on information that was admittedly proper for
national security reasons. Rather,
theplaintiffs questioned whether the
media should be denied access to

the arena in which American military forces were engaged. 6
The concept of "combat pools"
thatwouldconsistofreporters, photographers, and camera operators
was created by DOD regulation after the Vietnam War. The Vietnam
Conflict era press corps had virtually unlimited access to military activity, which enabled" American audiences to observe events daily, including casualties and deaths in vivid
and often painful detail.'"
In the post-Vietnam Conflict era,
the press worked under DOD pooling regulations in some form, specifically, during the Grenada and
Panama military operations. The
pools were permitted to go only
where assigned and were always
under the control ofauthorized military escort officers. These officers
had the authority, through an instant
"security review,"to stop interviews
or photography at any time they
deemed a potential security risk may
have existed. 8
The press pool regulations in
effect during the Persian Gulf War
were similar to the regulations in
effect during previous military operations. The regulations remained
in effect until they were formally
lifted by the DOD on March 4,
1991. Oral argument was heard in
the consolidated The Nation Magazine!Agence-France-Pressecase on
March 7, 1991.

The press argued that the DOD
pooling regulations infringed upon
the news-gathering privileges affordedbytheFirstAmendment The
DOD insisted that the federal court
dismiss the complaint without reaching the merits of the argument because, among other things, the controversy was moot and, therefore,
non-justiciable. In support of this
contention, the DOD pointed to the
fact that the regulations had been
lifted and, as a result, the controversy no longer existed. 9
Judge Leonard B. Sand, in a
precisely crafted opinion, acknowledged the DOD's argument that the
pooling regulations, having been
lifted, left no formal controversy
before the court. However, the Judge
considered whether this situation
was an ongoing controversy so as to
make the plaintiffs' challenge "capable of repetition, yet evading review."lo To decide the issue, the
court took note of the evolutionary
history of the DOD regulations.
After the Grenada and Panama
military operations, the DOD had
changed the regulations. The DOD
pointed out that such revisions were
on-going to the regulations, and to
the extent the DOD deemed appropriate, changes would be made in
accordance with suggestions offered
by the press. II
Judge Sand, therefore, thought it
was inappropriate to grant the press
injunctive or declaratory relief based
upon language in the regulations
that may be different if, and when,
another military operation takes
place. "The possibility ofrepetition
may not occur.... [R]epetition may
always be avoided by revision ofthe
challenged conduct." 12 As a result,
Judge Sand dismissed both lawsuits
as moot on April 16, 1991, holding
that "[p ]rudence dictates that a final
determination ofthe important constitutional issues at stake be left for

another day when the controversy is
more sharply focused."13
In Flynt v. Weinberger,14 Larry
Flynt ofHustler magazine fame filed
suit against Caspar Weinberger individually and in his capacity as
Secretary of Defense in the Reagan
Administration, because of the
policy prohibiting representatives
ofthe press from accompanying the
invasion forces during the U.S. intervention in Grenada. Members of
the press, who managed to make
their own way to the island, were
prevented from reporting news of
the invasion due to a military-imposed news blackout. Official U.S.

"The press argued
that the DOD pooling regulations infringed upon the
news-gatheringprivileges afforded by the
First Amendment. "
government sources issued the only
information available to the public
about the events occurring in
Grenada. IS
On October 27, 1983, two days
after the invasion, the press ban was
lifted and a limited number ofpress
representatives were permitted access to the island, subject to similar
pooling requirements imposed in
the recent Persian Gulf War. The
civilian airport at Grenada was
opened on November 7, 1983, and
press travel restrictions and pool
censorship were eliminated by the
DOD.16
The press in the Grenada case
sought declaratory and injunctive
relief from the initial press ban, but
unlike the press in the Persian Gulf

situation, did not challenge the DOD
press pool regulations. 11 Specifically, the press wanted an injunction to prohibit the military from
"preventing or otherwise hindering
Plaintiffs from sending reporters to
the sovereign nation of Grenada to
gather news ... " and a declaration
that "the course ofconduct engaged
in by Defendants, ... in preventing
Plaintiffs, or otherwise hindering
Plaintiffs' efforts to send reporters
to the sovereign nation of Grenada
for the purpose of gathering news is
in violation ofthe Constitution [sic]
laws, and treaties of the United
States .... "18
The Federal District Court for
the District of Columbia dismissed
the request for an injunction as moot
because, at the time of trial, the
press had unlimited access to
Grenada. On the question of declaratory relief, the court was required to look closely at the facts
and apply the technical requirements
of the mootness doctrine.
Without mentioning the weighty
notion of whether the public via the
press had a right to know the activities of the military in the Grenada
situation, the court stated that the
press had to prove b..Q!h aspects of
the exception to the mootness doctrine in order to have its case heard
by the court. The exceptions to
having a case dismissed due to
mootness occur when (1) the controversy is capable of repetition, yet
evades review,19 and (2) the defendant voluntarily ceases the challenged activity.20
The court reasoned that because
there was no expectation that the
controversy would recur, the situation did not fall within the exception. "The invasion of Grenada
was, like any invasion or military
intervention, a unique event. Its
occurrence required a combination
of geopolitical circumstances not
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likely to be repeated."21
Although it was unnecessary to
express an opinion on the second
exception, the court nevertheless
stated that the challenged activity
was voluntarily tenninated by the
government when the military lifted
the news blackout. Also, the court
observed that the ban on news coverage was contingent upon the exercise of executive discretion, and,
therefore, was not a "fixed and definite" government policy.22 Under
this rationale, the policy could be
altered in the event of future military conflicts. This dkta foreshadowed Judge Sand's opinion in the
Persian Gulf case.
The press in Flynt appealed the
district court's dismissal of its case
with prejudice. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld
the district court's dismissal for
mootness, but vacated that court's
opinion because it "improperly considered and offered judgments on
the underlying merits of the dispute."23 In vacating the opinion, the
appellate court left open an avenue
for the press to amend its complaint
and continue to challenge limitations on press access in the Grenada
intervention; however, no further
challenge was made.
As a matter of history, and as
these cases point out, the press has
not been held in high regard by the
military in general. 24 William
Tecumseh Shennan once said ofthe
press that they were "a dirty set of
scribblers who have the impudence
of Satan."25 Although the courts
have not resolved the issue of
whether the public has a "right to
know" in these situations, the notion
that the press has the right and/or the
responsibility to ferret out infonnation and provide it to the American
people seems ripe for discussion.
Although the First Amendment
does not contain the phrase "right to
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know," many understand it to be a
logical consequence ofconstitutionally mandated press freedom. For
example, while the first Amendment prohibits the gove'rnment from
creating a law orrule that'~'abridge[s]
the freedom of speech" for the general population, it does not stop
there. The Amendment explicitly
states that the government is prevented from making a rule that prohibits the press' freedom.
The pertinent section of the First
Amendment states as follows: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... " (emphasis added). Due
to the Amendment's structure, it is
only logical that the Free Press

"[IJtwould make little
sense to grant the
press the freedom of
publishing facts
without granting
the symbioticfreedom
to investigate matters
••••

"

Clause must contain additional protection to the freedom of speech
already granted to the general population, lest it be a mere constitutional redundancy. 26 Furthermore,
such a redundancy would not be
consistent with the Framers' obvious care in creating the document.
Moreover, it would make little
sense to grant the press the freedom
ofpublishing facts without granting
the symbiotic freedom to investigate matters and detennine which
facts to publish. Properly employed,
the "right to know" theory protects
this symbiotic relationship.

As a "reporter" of human events,
the journalist should be bound to a
multiplicity of ideas that comprise
his or her ''belief system" or "professional ideology."27 These ideas
include the dedication to social responsibility,28 the search for truth,29
objectivity,30 enlightened skepticism/I the public's right to know,32
and the view that journalism can be
an instrument of public education. 33
In Aristotelian tenns, the "good"
stemming from the "right to know"
is knowledge. Our constitutional
fonn ofgovernment is modeled upon
the premise that to be enlightened
with knowledge is a "good thing."
For example, our due process guarantee in criminal law provides an
accused individual with the right to
know the nature and cause of the
charges34 and the names of the witnesses making the accusation. 35
Thus, the Constitution gives credence to the notion that the "right to
know" is a good thing.
James Madison set out the fundamental importance ofsuch knowledge long ago:
A popular government,
without popular infonnation or the means ofacquiring it, is but a prologue to a
farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will
forever govern ignorance.
And a people who mean to
be their own governors,
must ann themselves with
the power knowledge
gives. 36
In the context of most recent First
Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
rights ofthe viewers and listeners of
mass media are paramount. 37 In a
case invo lving pornography, the S upreme Court upheld an individual's
constitutional right to possess such
material in the privacy of the home
and announced that "[i]t is now well
established that the Constitution

protects the right to receive information and ideas."38 In another
case, the Court reasoned that consumers have a right to know price
information on prescriptions from
their pharmacists. 39
Moreover, there is an explicit
assumption, even on the part of the
government, that the American
people have the right to know at
least some of the activities of its
government. This is evidenced by
the Freedom of Information Act,
state reporter shield laws, and sunshine statutes. 40 However, the Supreme Court has also held, in some
cases directly and in others by implication, ''that riders on public buses
have no right to receive [political]
campaign ads; that on certain highways the occupants of automobiles
have no right to receive billboard
ads; that television viewers have no
right to receive advertising for cigarettes; that the public has no absolute right to receive messages via
sound truck, or in privately owned
shopping malIs."4!
Thus, while the public's right to
know has not been legally granted
an unqualified stamp of approval,
the imprint of the right to know
nevertheless exists in our society,
albeit at some undefined level. As
one observernoted, ''the contours of
the right to know remain obscure. "42
To paraphrase James Madison,
our government is not worth a
plugged nickel without the proper
tools to acquire information about
the activities of the government and
disseminate it to the real governors:
the people. The press argue that it is
uniquely chosen by the Framers to
accomplish this objective, as evidenced by the protection granted by
the Free Press Clause. The question
that has now been posed in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War is
whether the press can successfully
challenge the rules promulgated by
the U.S. Department of Defense
using the ethereal concept of the
public's right to know as the "pry
bar" to permit media access.

It has been observed that the
spirit of the First Amendment and
the method in which it has been
interpreted make the public's right
to know "an integral part of the
system offreedom of expression."43
This concept is arguably "entitled to
support by legislation or other affirmative government action."44
It is likely, however, that the
most that will be offered to those
who champion the right to know is
simply the key to the courthouse
door. The amorphous nature of the
beast defies any realistic articulation of legal standards. As former
Supreme Court Justice Potter
Stewart observed: "The Constitution establishes the contest, not its
resolution."4s Such clashes, he notes,
are part of the woof and warp of a
constitutional system that accommodates both the iron rigidity ofthe
rule of law as well as the human
nature ofindividuals who must live
by that law. 46
The public's right to know, derived from a generous reading ofthe
Free Press Clause, creates the requisite standing for the press to challenge our government, but it does
not appear to guarantee victory.
Justice Stewart said that the Constitution itself "is not [a] Freedom of
Information Act, [nor is it] an Official Secrets Act."47
At any rate, a fundamental question of First Amendment jurisprudence remains unanswered. Specifically, to what extent may the
United States government restrict
access by the press to a military
operation, if the notion is accepted
that the press acts as surrogate for
the people? Based upon the case
law, it is unlikely that the press can
overcome the military's motion to
dismiss on the grounds of mootness.
It appears that the Defense Department need only argue that the pooling regulations are subject to ongoing revision and, as such, they will
not be the same in a subsequent
conflict.
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